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Abstract 
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can be drawn. It categorises the process as being driven by extreme 
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Introduction 
For just over 20 years the story of Irish social partnership has attracted an 
unprecedented wave of attention from academics and policy-makers from all 
over the world (see, for example, Auer; 2000; Baccaro, 2002; Sabel; 1996). The 
fact that Ireland, with its historically antagonistic, fragmented Anglo-Saxon 
industrial relations (IR) system, was capable of maintaining a corporatist-style 
system of socio-economic governance for so long (not to mention developing 
what seemed to be a unique model that demanded a review of traditionally 
accepted ‘corporatist truths’), fascinated and befuddled in equal measure. 
Throughout much of this period, too, the ‘Celtic Tiger’ economic success that 
accompanied the Irish experiment in social partnership was the ‘poster child’ of 
the new, smart, modern economy. It seemed Ireland could have it all; astonishing 
growth in wealth creation, an explosion in employment growth and all with a 
socially-inclusive governance structure. The Irish social partners could 
Riverdance gaily high above the choppy waters of industrial conflict and political 
division, safe in the knowledge that the safety-net of social partnership would 
catch them should they happen to misstep.  
 
The events of the past couple of years following the financial and social crisis 
that has gripped most of the Western world have brought the Irish social 
partnership juggernaut crashing to a halt amid widespread disillusionment and 
increasing recrimination. With Ireland in the grip of a deeper and (it seems likely) 
more prolonged economic recession than most, if not all, of its European 
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partners, consensus amongst the social partners has, for the first time in two 
decades, proven impossible to achieve in terms of negotiating a new national 
social pact. As a result, the Irish IR system is, at present, in a state of some 
uncertainty and flux.  
 
This article looks at some key factors involved in the demise of Irish social 
partnership and some of the broader implications to be drawn from the events of 
the last couple of years. It begins (briefly, for this is well-trodden ground) by 
outlining some of the more influential accounts of the Irish process, as well as the 
core elements of Irish social partnership. It then goes on to identify and explain 
some of the factors leading to the collapse of the process.  
 
There is a danger in such an approach of gorging on the benefits of hindsight. 
While it would be wrong to claim that the end of social partnership was not 
predicated by any commentators, it is fair to say that, much like the crisis itself, 
the collapse of the process, when it came, was relatively sudden and took most 
observers somewhat by surprise. In a time of flux, too, one should be careful 
about making definitive pronouncements. It may be, much like in the late 1980s, 
that Irish social partnership can surprise onlookers again with an unexpected 
revival.  
 
Notwithstanding the above however, this article takes the view that the process is 
moribund, if not completely dead, and so seeks some explanations for this state 
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of affairs. Two points should be made at the outset. First, the factors identified 
here did not emerge with the crisis. However, these pre-existing weaknesses 
exacerbated the demise of social partnership once the extent of the crisis 
became apparent. Second, this article will characterise social partnership as a 
process borne of, and sustained by, extreme pragmatism; a pragmatism, indeed, 
that is characteristic both of the Irish IR tradition and the Irish political system. 
Where the impact of the crisis intersects with both of these points can be 
summed up, rather inelegantly, as the point at which the money ran out. 
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It couldn’t happen here 
Ireland has been categorised as one of the ‘unlikely countries’ (Baccaro, 2003) to 
engage with a corporatist strategy and one of a number in which the ‘corporatist 
Sisyphus’ rose again in the late 1980s/early 1990s (Schmitter and Grote, 1997). 
Given the absence of many of the ‘institutional preconditions’ (Baccaro, 2002) for 
corporatist deals and Ireland’s Anglo-Saxon IR tradition, much attention in the 
literature has been focused on ‘accounting’ for the Irish case (Roche, 2007). One 
of the most influential perspectives centres on the idea of ‘deliberative 
governance’ (O’ Donnell, 2000).  In the Irish case, this referred to a wide range of 
State and non-State actors adopting a ‘problem-solving’ approach to socio-
economic governance, which focused on much more than simply pay and other, 
narrow labour market issues, but attempted to create shared understandings 
(and shape and reshape the parties’ identity and preferences) about broader 
social and economic challenges. 
  
By contrast, the leading critiques of the process substantially echo those of 
classical corporatism. Allen (2000) has argued that the partnership structures 
provided a political, industrial and ideological framework through which a neo-
liberal agenda could be pursued. He is particularly critical of union leaders who, 
for him, became co-opted by employers and the State, with the result that 
membership-led and resistance strategies were downgraded and workplace 
activism undermined. Other critics have focused on the anti-democratic nature of 
the process, especially the emasculation of parliamentary democracy (Ó’ 
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Cinnéide, 1998), which saw elected representatives (and non-privileged civil 
society interest groups) effectively excluded from national policy-making, which 
was devolved to a select group of ‘insiders’.  
 
Others have argued that the Irish partnership process, rather than being 
analysed in terms of (non/) democratic outcomes can best be understood in 
terms of ‘competitive corporatism’ and the need, acknowledged by all the social 
partners, to improve the competitiveness of the national economy, without the 
traditional corporatist concern for re-distributional policies or social safety nets 
(Roche, 2007). More recently, Teague and Donaghy (2009) have characterised 
the process as an ‘unorthodox system of institutional complementarities’, where a 
bundle of institutions and practices combine so that each increases the efficiency 
of the others. So, they argue, the system of social partnership blended with other 
aspects of the Irish economy to create a distinctive regime of economic growth; a 
successive governmental policy of economic openness, a minimal welfare state 
and social partnership all interacted with a favourable international economic 
climate in the 1990s and 2000s to trigger employment growth and increased 
prosperity.  
 
These various perspectives all contain important insights about the social 
partnership process. Commonalities in the accounts can be difficult to find, but a 
few points can be made. First, all of the accounts accept that the Irish social 
partnership process emerged as a response to the political, employment and 
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economic crisis of the late 1980s. By 1987, Irish economic and social life was in 
a grave state with a spiralling level of public deficit and debt and extremely high 
levels of personal taxation and unemployment (O’Connell, 2000). Virtually all 
sections of the trade union movement were suffering from the most sustained 
and serious losses in trade union membership recorded since the 1920s (Roche, 
1997). The weak, minority Fianna Fáil (FF) Government was a key driver behind 
the first social pact as that cross-class, ‘catch-all’ party, traditionally the State’s 
dominant political force, was desperate to shore up support amongst both 
business interests (by championing wage restraint and control of the public 
finances) and its middle and working-class base (through tax reform and 
continued social protection for vulnerable groups; Hamann and Kelly, 2007: 981-
984). Thus, it will be argued throughout that the partnership strategy emerged as 
a pragmatic response by the social partners to a desperate situation- we will see 
how such pragmatism later informs a shift in the respective parties’ positions 
when crisis strikes again twenty years on.  
 
Secondly, virtually all accounts accept that social partnership became, over time, 
a very definite and distinctive process. Centralised bargaining was not new to 
Irish industrial relations; in the 1970s pay agreements were negotiated centrally, 
and even in periods of free collective bargaining like the early 1980s, local 
bargaining tended to follow central trends (Hardiman, 1988). However, certain 
characteristics distinguished social partnership after 1987; the contents of the 
agreements became somewhat all-encompassing, expanding to cover virtually all 
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areas of socio-economic policy-making (migration, waste management, 
alcohol/drug misuse, housing policy, etc.); the composition of the social partners 
moved from being solely the labour market actors to encompass a range of other 
civic, community and voluntary groups (farmers’ organisations-included, albeit in 
a separate ‘pillar’ of talks, from the beginning- gay and lesbian groups, charity 
organisations etc); and, from the early to mid 2000s, the emphasis was on 
expanding the time frame of the non-pay elements of the agreement (through the 
use of long-term ‘special initiatives’ and a ‘lifecycle framework’ in later 
agreements). As we will see below, however, it may be that, to paraphrase 
Marshall McLuhan, the process became the point.  
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This time it really is different… 
A comprehensive account of the Irish social partnership process is beyond the 
scope of this article; in any case, many accounts by eminently more erudite 
authors are readily available (Hardiman, 2000; Roche, 2007; Teague and 
Donaghy, 2004). Seven tripartite social pacts were concluded between 1987 and 
2009: The Programme for National Recovery (PNR, 1987-1990); The Program 
for Social and Economic Progress (PESP, 1990-1993); The Program for 
Competitiveness and Work (PCW, 1993-1996); Partnership 2000 (P2000, 1996-
2000); The Program for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF, 2000-2003); Sustaining 
Progress (SP, 2003-2006); and Towards 2016 (T2016; agreed in 2006, the pay 
provisions were renewed in 2008. Other provisions were to run for 10 years, 
before the collapse of the process in 2009).  
 
The basis of the agreements has always been trade-offs between wage 
moderation, fiscal restraint and tax concessions. The agreements have also 
addressed other core labour market issues such as industrial peace, labour 
market flexibility, active labour market policy, work organisation and social 
welfare reform. Table 1 summarises the main process from 1987-2009. 
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Table 1. Social Partnership in Ireland 1987-2009 
Agreement Context of 
negotiations 
Content 
1987-1990 PNR 
 
 
 
 
1990-1993 PESP 
1993-1996 PCW 
Crisis; unemployment;  
Thatcherite assault on 
unions in the UK 
 
 
EMU criteria to be met; 
jobless economic 
growth 
Pay moderation for tax 
concessions; 
industrial peace 
clauses 
 
Welfare reform; supply 
side policies 
1996-2000 P2000 
2000-2003 PPF 
Economic boom, full 
employment 
Introduction of 
community and 
voluntary sector as 
social partners; 
promotion of 
workplace partnership 
2003-2006 SP (*pay 
renegotiated after 18 
months) 
Gloomy economic 
climate; slowing 
growth; some job 
losses 
Pay deal only for 18 
months, ‘Special 
Initiatives’ 
(educational 
disadvantage, child 
poverty, housing etc,) 
2006-2016 T2016 
(initial pay deal runs 
for 27 months) 
 
 
 
2008- pay deal 
(rejected by 
construction 
employers) 
 
2009- process 
collapses 
Return to economic 
health; concern about  
compliance with 
labour standards 
 
 
Emerging economic 
and banking crisis; 
public finances in 
crisis 
Longer (10 yr) ‘life-
cycle’ framework; 
measures to 
strengthen 
compliance with 
labour standards 
 
  
 
From 1997, the partnership process expanded to include a wide spectrum of civil 
society groups (the ‘Community and Voluntary Pillar’ or CVP). It also expanded 
to encompass more non-core labour market issues such as social inclusion, 
childcare, racism, and housing policy (Gunnigle at al, 1999). This increasing 
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range of elite community based policy-making was ‘reflected in a dense web of 
working groups, committees and task forces, which involve the social partners in 
the design, implementation and monitoring of public policy’ (O’Donnell and O’ 
Reardon 2000: 237-8). 
 
The social partner associations were never monopolies and nor was membership 
in them compulsory. The bargaining and implementation processes have always 
been voluntary and unilateral withdrawal was possible at any time. Since the 
terms of the agreements were not legally binding unless passed into law by 
parliament, the Irish Government was free to treat the agreements as advisory 
documents choosing which issues to fully implement, subject, of course, to 
industrial relations and political considerations.  
 
Thus, in early 2009, in the context of a rapid deterioration in the public finances, 
a collapse in the housing market and construction sector and a liquidity crisis for 
the banking system, the Government and the private sector employers sought to 
renegotiate the wage agreement struck in 2008 (O’ Kelly, 2010). In March 2009, 
the Government broke off negotiations and introduced an emergency budget, 
which introduced pay cuts for all public sector workers. After a rapid rise in 
private sector unemployment, and in the aftermath of a protest strike in 
November 2009, a new partnership agreement appeared to be on the verge of 
conclusion in December 2009. However, at the last minute a revolt by 
Government ministers and backbenchers over aspects of the deal relating to 
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public sector reform led to the Government withdrawing and the effective end of 
the Irish social partnership process (ibid.). The December 2009 budget again cut 
public sector pay by an average of 7 percent.  
 
In March 2010, the public sector unions and the Government agreed a new four-
year Public Service Agreement (the ‘Croke Park Agreement’),i under which it was 
agreed that public sector pay would not be cut again during the lifetime of the 
Agreement (which runs until 2014). This would be in exchange for a reduction in 
public sector numbers (by means of continuing the existing moratorium on 
recruitment and promotion); ‘flexible redeployment’ within and across each sector 
of the public service; and a substantial commitment to reconfigure the design and 
delivery of public services (including the redesign of work processes). Despite 
considerable opposition to the deal amongst and within many unions (McDonagh 
and Dundon, 2010), the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) Public Services 
Committee ratified the deal in June 2010 by a margin of almost two-thirds. 
 
This represents the Irish position in late 2010, as the public awaits a December 
budget that will look to make public savings of approximately €6 billion by means 
of tax rises, and welfare and public service cuts. The next sections will try and 
account for the inability of the social partners to conclude a social pact in the face 
of the recent crisis (as they were able to do in the dire circumstances of the 
1980s). The focus will, first, be on issues relating to the primary actors (the State, 
the employers and the unions) and then shifts to the social partnership process. 
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Where did it all go wrong? The actors 
The State 
The Irish social partnership process emerged as a response to the crisis 
engulfing the country in the late 1980s. The origins of the process are often 
traced back to the publication in 1986 of a highly influential report (A Strategy for 
Development 1986-1990) on economic strategy by the National Economic and 
Social Council (NESC- a tripartite advisory body, established in 1973). The report 
argued for many of what were to become the central elements of the partnership 
process: wage restraint; control of public spending; tax reform; reform of the 
public sector; but also the progressive removal of the major iniquities in Irish 
society (O’Donnell and Thomas, 2002).  As Hamann and Kelly (2007: 983) note, 
the Fianna Fáil (FF) leadership appropriated much of the report in its 1987 
election manifesto and was returned to power as a minority government. With the 
exception of the period between 1994 and 1996, the FF party has remained in 
power until the present (from 1989 on as the dominant party in a coalition 
government). Thus, the social partnership era has become significantly 
associated with FF and, in particular, with two men. Charles Haughey was leader 
of the party from 1979-92 and served as Taoiseach (Prime Minister) on four 
occasions until 1992. Bertie Ahern was Minister for Labour in 1987, later Minister 
for Finance, and Taoiseach himself from 1997- 2007. At the outset of the 
partnership process in 1987, it was Haughey who is significantly credited with 
getting the unions and, particularly, the employers to the bargaining table 
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(Hastings et al, 2007: 39). Under both men, the Department of the Taoiseach 
was significantly and progressively empowered and was headed by successive 
Secretary-Generals who were closely associated with their political masters and 
were powerful and committed champions of the partnership process (Mac Sharry 
and White, 2001).   
 
However, the fundamental and dominant role played by successive Governments 
in the Irish partnership process meant that the process was extremely 
susceptible to changing political winds. D’ Art and Tuner (2005) note that the role 
of the State in most western European countries that have engaged the social 
partners in some sort of tripartite governance model has been neutral or 
supportive, aimed at persuading pragmatic employers to recognise and negotiate 
with trade unions. Once this has been achieved and trust begins to develop 
between the parties, tripartite bargaining tends to involve some sort of devolution 
of policy-making to the social partners themselves. However, the Irish process 
has always been conducted in the ‘shadow of representative democracy’ 
(Donaghy, 2008: 58), whereby, ultimately, final decisions were taken by 
Government, which retained its capacity to act unilaterally on what it viewed as 
electorally sensitive issues, irrespective of the interests of the social partners 
(Hardiman, 2006).  
 
In a political system such as exists in Ireland, with no ‘left-right’ ideological divide, 
with a high degree of personalism in voting choice, where politicians are 
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extremely responsive to localised concerns, and where power is very strongly 
centralised around the executive (O’ Malley, 2011), the process was, as a result, 
always open to a withdrawal of Governmental support. Partnership, then, can be 
seen, from the Governmental perspective, as a pragmatic political choice rather 
than an articulated and embedded ideology or strategy for socio-economic 
governance. Even within the Government itself, the process was championed by 
the Department of the Taoiseach (concerned principally with the political agenda 
of the Government) but viewed with considerably less warmth, and often 
opposed, by officials, and at certain times, ministers, in the Department of 
Finance (Roche, 2010). Similarly, as noted above, criticisms were voiced at times 
by opposition politicians and Government backbench deputies that the process 
had usurped the role of parliamentary democracy. 
 
The withdrawal of political support, when it came, was swift and brutal. The 
NESC report of March 2009 (Ireland’s Five-Part Crisis: An Integrated National 
Response) called for an integrated national response to the crisis that addressed 
the banking crisis, the fiscal crisis, the economic crisis of competitiveness and job 
losses, the social crisis of unemployment and income loss, and the reputational 
crisis. The contrast with the reception of the celebrated report of 1986 could not 
have been starker, as the Government decided to effectively ignore the social 
partners and focus its attention almost exclusively on the banking, and latterly the 
fiscal, crises. Indeed, as McDonagh and Dundon (2010: 558) point out, ‘the 
abandonment of social partnership has, arguably, been central to the 
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government’s strategy of dealing with the crisis’.  A particularly illustrative 
example of the interests of the social partners being sacrificed on the altar of 
political pragmatism relates to the construction sector, the sector hit hardest by 
the economic collapse. The construction industry social partners, despite being 
engaged in a prolonged pay dispute, came together to agree in 2009 a stimulus 
proposal based on investing pension funds in new public infrastructure projects. 
By this time, however, the popular mood had turned strongly against support for 
the sector (‘property developers’ being strongly associated in the public mind with 
the crisis) and the proposal was rejected. As one ICTU official put it, the 
‘Government were so busy with the banks they wouldn’t take any other decisions’ 
(interview with the author, August 2010).  
 
Some may point to the longevity of the process as a counterpoint to the 
argument that social partnership never became embedded in the Irish IR system. 
However, the argument here is that political and Governmental support for the 
process was always highly contingent and pragmatic. By 2009, key ‘champions’ 
of the process, particularly Bertie Ahern, had departed the scene and, as Roche 
(2010) points out his successor as Taoiseach, Brian Cowen, ‘seemed willing to 
expend little political capital to preserve the fabric of a social partnership model 
that no longer seemed publicly or electorally popular’. The ‘people factor’ 
(Hastings et al, 2007: chapter 7) has always been seen as crucial in the Irish 
model (union leaders, famously, could phone up Ahern and talk ‘one-to-one’ 
while he was Minister for Labour), but a process that depends so much on 
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individual relationships and personalities is vulnerable when key players exit the 
stage.  
 
More fundamental, however, was the fact that the State’s driving role in the 
partnership process meant that at no time since 1987 did the social partners 
challenge the main tenets of the government’s economic policy (Teague and 
Donaghy, 2009a). Thus, unions did not seek to trade wage restraint for increased 
public expenditure or progressive redistribution policies, but instead for a reduced 
taxation burden on workers and institutional influence. Such a strategy worked 
well in times of economic and employment growth, when the Government could 
reduce the tax burden and sanction moderate wage increases, but once the 
crisis hit concessions were required. As we have seen, as unions struggled 
compromise on how to manage the economic downturn, the Government quickly 
reverted to a unilateral approach of spending and welfare cuts, tax increases, 
and pay and staffing cuts in the public sector. When the money ran out, the 
dominant partner very quickly packed up the partnership tent.   
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The Employers 
As noted above, it was the employers who were initially the most reluctant of the 
social partners to embrace tripartite bargaining in 1987, only signing up to the 
PNR following the ‘vigorous advocacy and brokerage’ of the then-Taoiseach, 
Haughey (Roche, 2007: 398). Nevertheless, over the 20 years that followed, the 
main employer representative groups (led by the Irish Business and Employers’ 
Confederation- IBEC) have been key supporters of the process.ii Roche (2007: 
421) has argued that the institutionalisation of Irish social partnership involved a 
refashioning of hierarchical control mechanisms (which, under classical 
corporatist arrangements, were commonly viewed in terms of the formal internal 
governance structures of union and employer peak organisations) so that the 
core participants were able, and prepared, to isolate groups of workers or 
employers whose activities were seen to be threatening the process. This was 
done through applying moral or social pressure on non-compliant groups, 
through the intervention of the National Implementation Body (NIB- the body-
established under the PPF-charged with ‘policing’ the agreements and IR stability 
generally and made up senior Government, employer and union representatives) 
and through copper-fastening the role of the ‘older’ public institutions for IR 
conflict resolution, the Labour Relations Commission and Labour Court.  
 
However, it seems that the social partners have become increasingly unable 
(unwilling?) to ‘discipline’, in particular, recalcitrant employers. Writing a decade 
ago, Heery (2001: 315) noted that ‘while the official discourse of European 
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industrial relations deploys the language of "partnership," there is evidence of 
European employers becoming less tolerant of unions than in the past’. Sheehan 
(2008) has commented that the notion in Irish IR of the ‘good employer’ has been 
fundamentally altered over the past two decades. Previously, under the Irish 
voluntarist system, the ‘good employer’ engaged in collective bargaining with 
trade unions, abided by procedural agreements and respected the State’s 
dispute resolution agencies (ibid: 106). However, in recent years these aspects 
of the Irish system have come under strain. We will look at the issue of trade 
union bargaining rights in the next section, but there is a trend of growing 
antipathy towards unions by some major employers, which has included the 
victimisation of activists involved in union recognition campaigns (D'Art and 
Turner, 2005; O’Sullivan and Gunnigle, 2009). The voices of the non-union 
employers outside of the social partnership process have become louder and 
more influential. 
 
There a number of related points to be made here. In its drive to secure foreign 
direct investment (FDI) the State’s industrial development agencies, from the 
early 1980s, have ‘marketed’ Ireland as non-union environment, at least in part 
as a response to the refusal of US multinationals (MNCs) to recognise unions, 
and their position that any statutory recognition measures would be unacceptable 
to them (Gunnigle et al, 1998). Powerful (mainly US-based) MNCs, therefore, 
have throughout the partnership era refused to engage with trade unions (a 
position ‘sanctioned’ by the Irish State) and have not been a party to partnership 
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agreements. However, as Baccaro and Simoni (2007) note, social partnership 
has ‘morally legitimated’ MNCs  to ‘shadow’ the agreements and pay similar 
wage increases as domestic companies, despite demonstrable differences in 
productivity gains, thus considerably boosting their cost competitiveness and 
profits.  
 
At the same time, the main organisation representing the collective voice of US 
companies located in Ireland- the American Chamber of Commerce Ireland- is 
known to wield considerable influence. This was demonstrated to staggering 
effect when the Irish government, at the promptings of the Chamber and large 
individual US MNCs, first opposed, and later succeeded in watering down, the 
EU’s Information and Consultation Directive (Directive 2002/14; see Doherty, 
2008). One of the most contentious provisions of the Irish legislation transposing 
the Directive (the Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 
2006) is section 11, which allows employers to comply with the law by ignoring or 
bypassing employee representative structures (union and non-union) and 
provides for direct information and consultation arrangements.  
 
Sheehan (2008: 112-118) has also noted an increasing tendency amongst 
powerful indigenous employers, who previously would have abided by the ‘rules 
of the game’, to refuse to engage with third-party dispute resolution bodies or to 
accept non-binding recommendations from the Labour Court. There have also 
been a number of legal challenges to the State’s long-established system for 
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establishing pay and conditions in sectors such as construction, retail and 
catering, where pay rates and other terms and conditions of employment are 
established by bodies representative of the social partners (Meenan, 2009). 
Here, loose groupings of employers are challenging the representativeness of 
these bodies, as well as the constitutionality of the entire process on the grounds 
that allowing social partner bodies to set legally binding terms and conditions of 
employment represents an impermissible delegation of legislative functions to a 
body other than the Parliament. At the time of writing, the cases have not 
reached finality, but the State has been forced to ‘shore up’ the system with new 
legislation (published in 2009, but not yet passed into law). Nevertheless, the 
legal challenges demonstrate the increasing fragmentation of employer interests.  
 
The argument here is not that the social partnership has caused these changes 
in employer postures (clearly, the decision in relation to attracting FDI was made 
some time before the partnership process began). However, undoubtedly political 
choices relating to trade union and worker representation rights (those discussed 
above and in the next section) resulted in a lopsided form of partnership where 
social partner co-operation at national level was never ‘underpinned by a code of 
rights to guarantee social partner engagement at the enterprise level’ (O’ Hagan 
2002: 152). McDonagh and Dundon (2010: 556-7) note that it has been easy, 
given the very few constraints placed on private sector employers by the ‘the 
increasingly permissive nature’ of the Irish voluntarist system (underpinned, as 
we will see shortly, by the partnership process itself), for employers to shift 
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rapidly from discussions about the redistribution of economic gains to imposing 
concessions (via pay or job cuts, or changes to work practices) in the face of the 
current crisis. Over time, the benefits to employers of continuing to operate a 
partnership system, when set against the advantages observed to be obtained by 
those ‘outside the tent’, have become less obvious. This, of course, is a key tenet 
of the argument of the ‘incorporation’ theorists, who see the ultimate aim and 
outcome of a ‘partnership’ strategy as the demobilisation of union resistance to 
employer interests (Allen, 2000; Kelly, 1998). 
 
The Unions 
By buying into the social partnership model, the Irish trade union movement fixed 
on a strategy of exchanging wage moderation and industrial peace for policy and 
institutional influence (Teague and Donaghy, 2009). Thus, a policy of political 
action through the pursuit of a corporatist model of governance, as well as 
(significantly more limited) engagement with employers at the workplace, has, in 
Frege and Kelly’s (2004) terms been the ‘renewal strategy’ pursued by the Irish 
union movement.  
 
The extent to which unions did, in fact, secure institutional influence through the 
partnership process has provoked considerable debate. To take just one 
example of contention, the unions can point to the considerable body of 
protective labour legislation passed during the social partnership era (Donaghy 
and Teague, 2007). Through partnership, a number of statutory measures were 
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agreed, which were then progressed through the normal legislative process; 
these included legislation on the national minimum wage, ‘exceptional’ collective 
redundancies and employment rights compliance.iii However, it must be 
emphasised again that such measures ultimately require the imprimatur of the 
Government before they become law. So, for example, the much-trumpeted new 
legislation on better compliance with labour standards, one of the key elements 
of the T2016 agreement, was agreed by the social partners in response to large-
scale disputes involving the exploitation of migrant workers at two companies, 
Gama and Irish Ferries (Krings, 2009). The resulting Employment Law 
Compliance Bill 2008 grants significantly enhanced powers to the State’s Labour 
Inspectorate, provides for greater penalties for employer offenders (most of 
which are criminal sanctions, such as fines and imprisonment); and places 
comprehensive new record-keeping obligations on employers. However, the 
stringency of the measures (and the criminal law focus) has provoked quite a 
backlash against the Bill by employer groups (Dobbins, 2008). In particular, small 
and medium sized business, fearful of the cost and administrative implications of 
the legislation, have been lobbying local politicians on the issue; as a result, two 
years on from its publication, the Bill has still not been passed into law.  
 
It is the failure of the unions to extend their influence beyond the high-level 
context of national talks, though, that has arguably dealt the biggest blow to 
union advocates of the partnership strategy. The trade unions have tried, under 
partnership, to find means of strengthening their presence at workplace level. 
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From the mid-1990s, increasing focus was put on the dissemination of 
partnership to the level of the enterprise. The social partners outlined a voluntary 
framework promoting the diffusion of workplace partnership, with the national 
agreement Partnership 2000 defining enterprise partnership and identifying nine 
areas in which the concept would be particularly apposite.iv Despite the 
promotion of workplace partnership, the empirical evidence has shown that its 
incidence and significance, especially in the private sector, appears quite limited 
(Geary, 2007; O’ Connell et al, 2004; 2010). This is not surprising. Whereas 
corporatist arrangements traditionally established a national framework of 
entitlements and obligations to guide how employers and employees should 
behave at the workplace, social partnership in the Irish case did not display such 
interlocking connections between the national and local levels. The social pacts 
placed few constraints on private sector firms granting them almost ‘complete 
autonomy to pursue corporate strategies of their choosing at the company level’ 
(Teague and Donaghey 2009: 67).  
 
It was in this context that the trade unions pushed for a change in union 
recognition laws. Traditionally, the Irish voluntarist model of IR has meant that 
there is no obligation on employers to recognise a trade union for collective 
bargaining purposes and collective agreements are generally not legally binding. 
Employees have a constitutional right to form and join trade unions, but 
employers are not obliged to recognise such unions as having the right to 
represent their members in negotiations. In 2000, a High Level Group on Trade 
 26
Union Recognition was established, under Partnership 2000, look at reform of 
union bargaining laws. A compromise was reached that resulted in the 
enactment of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Acts 2001-2004. Under this 
legislation, an employer may be compelled to grant trade union representatives 
the right to represent unionised employees on workplace issues relating to pay, 
and terms and conditions of employment. The Labour Court can make a legally 
binding determination with regard to these matters, and to dispute resolution and 
disciplinary procedures, in the employment concerned; the determination, 
though, cannot provide for arrangements for collective bargaining (Doherty, 
2009).  
 
The unions had hoped to use this legislation as a ‘springboard’ to greater 
recognition rights and the number of claims being processed under the Acts 
increased significantly between 2004 and 2006. However, the legislation has 
been regarded as largely neutered following the decision of the Irish Supreme 
Court in Ryanair v The Labour Court.v The Supreme Court ruled that the Labour 
Court had incorrectly interpreted what was meant by, and which bodies could 
engage in, ‘collective bargaining’ under the Acts. The Supreme Court held that 
employers should be free to determine the form, structure and organisation of 
any internal collective bargaining units, as long as these have a degree of 
permanency and are not ad hoc. Thus, if an employer were to set up an 
Employee Council, it could seemingly decide on issues such as how employees 
would be elected or chosen to be members, the remit of the Council, and the 
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terms of office of its members. In a final flourish, the Supreme Court noted that it 
was ‘not in dispute that as a matter of law Ryanair is perfectly entitled not to deal 
with trade unions’ and went on the suggest that neither could a law be passed 
compelling it to do so.vi Irish unions (like those in the UK) had long been 
suspicious of legal intervention in industrial relations, fearing a hostile judiciary 
and the ceding of control of labour market regulation by unions and employers to 
legal professionals. Ironically, the partnership process has accompanied a rapid 
‘legalisation’ of employment relations; the Ryanair decision (much like recent 
experiences of unions before the European Court of Justice) has illustrated well 
the dangers of such a state of affairs (Doherty, 2009).  
 
Thus, 20 years of social partnership has not resulted in a strengthening of 
unions’ workplace representation rights (and the extent to which the failure to 
build organisational strength has been compensated for by increased institutional 
influence must also be questioned). In fact, following the Ryanair decision, the 
position in Ireland seems to come close to permitting the establishment of 
‘company unions’; a unique situation in an ‘old’ EU Member State. Over the 
partnership period, union density has continued to decline, in tandem with levels 
of industrial action (Donaghy and Teague, 2007; Walsh and Strobl 2009). Again, 
it would be intemperate to draw a causal connection here. The problems of 
declining density and blunted capacity to engage in industrial action have been 
experienced by union movements all over the Western world, including those 
who have adopted stances contrary to a partnership approach. The problem for 
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Irish unions is, for a considerable period, social partnership has been viewed as 
‘the only game in town’ (Donaghy and Teague, 2007: 39). Given that bargaining 
was centralised and the national agreements contained a variety of no-strike 
clauses, the breakdown of the process now sees a generation of union 
representatives and activists who have no experience of engaging in collective 
bargaining or of taking collective action. Of the three main actors, the unions 
seemed the most anxious to maintain the process, delaying industrial action in 
order to keep partnership negotiations going (McDonagh and Dundon, 2010). 
Organisational weakness, however, makes the unions considerably less 
attractive as a social partner.  
 
The Process 
Means and ends 
The Irish model of social partnership attracted attention due to its distinctive and 
all-encompassing nature. This included the broad range of actors involved 
(notably the inclusion of the community and voluntary pillar- CVP) and the broad 
sweep of issues that the national pacts addressed. Those focusing on the 
‘deliberative’ nature of the process have tended to emphasise its focus on 
‘problem-solving’ over ‘hard-nosed’ bargaining, and the attempts to create shared 
understandings and prioritise social consensus rather than debate ultimate 
political or social visions (O’ Donnell, 2000). This feature of the Irish process was 
manifested in the establishment of a dense web of working groups, committees 
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and task forces, which sought to involve the social partners in public policy-
making (Baccaro, 2006). Indeed, it was argued that the ‘increasingly elaborate 
institutional architecture’ of social partnership stabilised the process in many key 
ways and at various important junctures (Roche, 2007: 418). The process, too, 
placed considerable emphasis on producing procedural consensus between the 
key actors to guide the search for solutions to identified challenges (Teague, 
2001).  
 
However, a stabilised system that knows procedurally how to search for solutions 
does not necessarily produce functional outcomes; over time the ‘fit between 
agreements and economic context’, which may once have been intentional or 
serendipitous, can subsequently become ‘dysfunctional, all within broadly the 
same framework of negotiations’ (Hardiman, 2007; 5-6). There has been a 
question mark over the capacity of the partnership process to ‘deliver’, outside 
the core areas of pay, tax reform and industrial peace.  
 
First, a closer look at the agreements themselves reveals some interesting 
features. In form, the agreements are akin to political manifestos; an introduction 
that lays out the approach and context, chapters or frameworks based on themes 
(tax reform, workplace relations, social inclusion and equality etc), and, 
throughout, numbered, specific actions or commitments. The first agreement (the 
PNR) was 32 pages in length; the latest (T2016) ran to 139 pages. What is 
striking is the number of commitments that pledge to submit an issue to ‘review’, 
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usually by means of establishing a working group or task force. Turner (2002) 
notes that 23 such groups were set up under the PPF alone, while Hardiman 
(2006) counts 65 working groups set up by the late 1990s looking at issues from 
pensions to childcare. Thus, a significant feature of the partnership process 
involved the avoidance and postponement of difficult or contentious decisions in 
favour of deliberation and attempts at problem-solving; however, prolonged and 
reasoned debate can sometimes simply lead to entrenchment in a party’s original 
position (Donaghey, 2008).  
 
By the time Sustaining Progress was agreed, it was tacitly acknowledged by the 
parties that very few concrete initiatives had emerged from the various groups 
and task forces and their incidence was scaled back significantly in that 
agreement and its successor, T2016 (ibid.). Moreover, once the crisis struck, and 
fiscal difficulties meant the opportunities for issues to be the subject of review 
and compromise were circumscribed, the Government ultimately made the ‘hard’ 
decisions and took little account of the advice of partnership institutions or the 
social partners themselves. It was quite happy to sweep away the institutional 
web. 
 
Secondly, a focus on the text of the agreements substantially serves to simply 
confirm what many observers of, and some participants in, the process have long 
suspected; that ultimately, some partners have been more valued than others. 
The role of the non-core actors, the ‘social pillar’ or CVP, has ultimately come to 
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be seen as rather marginal to the main business of social partnership, which has 
primarily involved the State and the labour market actors (Hardiman, 1998; 
Roche, 2007). As Larragy (2006: 20) notes ‘it seems obvious that there is a 
hierarchy of social partners in the Irish model and the CVP is somewhat 
subordinate in bargaining power terms’. The author also notes, in line with the 
central argument in this article, that the fortunes of the community and voluntary 
pillar have waxed and waned according to the extent the Government of the day 
found its imprimatur politically useful: 
 
‘The main bargaining chip the CVP has in social partnership it is whether it 
rejects or signs off on a deal. But just how far it could "play it" depends on 
the political context - or what such a rejection might cost a government in 
popularity. That chip had an impact in the context of negotiating 
Partnership 2000, when the threat to reject the pact resulted in a last 
minute concession by Government. But the threatened rejection of 
Sustaining Progress in 2002 by a section of the Pillar resulted only in that 
section's expulsion from the partnership process’ (ibid: 20). 
 
When unemployment was a political priority in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Governments of the day were quite grateful for the legitimacy conferred by 
engaging with organisations representing the unemployed and other civil society 
associations (and, indeed, the unions); when the realpolitik was deemed to 
demand social welfare and public service cuts in the wake of the crisis, these 
organisations’ embeddedness in the process was quickly undone.   
 
Thirdly, it should be noted that even the most enthusiastic accounts of the 
partnership process have always recognised the centrality of the pay provisions 
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to the national agreements. The pay deal has always been the ‘glue’ holding the 
process togethervii and pay negotiations certainly did not come under the range 
of issues for deliberation, but remained to be bargained over in a traditional 
manner. Survey data, whilst limited, has tended to suggest relatively strong 
levels of public support for social partnership (see, for example, Fitzgerald and 
Girvin, 2000). However, it is arguable that much of this support for the process 
seems to have hinged almost exclusively on pay outcomes (see, for example, 
D’Art and Turner; 2002). Doherty (2007) indeed, in his survey, of trade union 
members found that the vast majority of had very little knowledge of the ‘broader 
partnership agenda’; outside of pay and industrial conflict, members had little 
understanding of other policy aspects of the process, even where (in areas like 
childcare, housing, etc) these were issues of concern that had a significant 
impact on their working lives. It seems for employers, unions and the public at 
large, the partnership process was ultimately about pay deals; when the ‘glue’ of 
pay increases could no longer be delivered, the process quickly became unstuck. 
 
The Public Sector and Reform 
One feature that has been somewhat underplayed in the literature on partnership 
has been the role of the public sector. In fact, this is crucial to any analysis of the 
Irish process, not least because trade union density in the public sector is much 
higher than in the private sector, and so the public sector unions (in particular the 
state’s second-largest union, the Irish Municipal Public and Civil Trade Union-
IMPACT) have always had a key role in shaping and sustaining the process 
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(Hastings et al, 2007). Accounts that have looked at the role of the public sector 
have tended to emphasise the benefits wrought for public sector workers by their 
unions in terms of pay (Baccaro and Simoni, 2007) for which the State received 
in return commitments on industrial relations stability (Donaghy and Teague, 
2007). While undoubtedly public sector workers did gain in pay terms (as did 
virtually all workers in the ‘Celtic Tiger’ era) much less attention has been placed 
on the focus of the partnership agreements on public sector reform, particularly 
after 1997.  
 
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD, 2008: 18), Ireland has ‘significantly advanced along a New Public 
Management (NPM) continuum’ of public sector reform which has explicitly 
brought the social partners on board to input into the reform process. In fact, an 
elaborate performance management system has been devised, through 
partnership, for the public sector whereby the payment of agreed salary 
increases for public employees depends upon co-operation with satisfactory local 
implementation of the modernisation agenda set out in national agreements.viii 
Performance Verification Groups (PVGs) for different sectors (health, local 
government, etc) were established to make recommendations as to whether or 
not pay increases should be granted. In all cases, it was envisaged that the 
process of reform and  the successful implementation of the change and 
innovation outlined in the national agreements would be accompanied  by 
‘robust’ workplace partnership structures ‘characterised by high levels of 
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employee and union involvement with management’ (NCPP, 2005: 30). However, 
Doherty and Erne (2010) have argued that, despite the democratic and inclusive 
rhetoric, workplace partnership in the public sector has been used simply as a 
means of facilitating the implementation of a pre-determined management reform 
agenda.  They argue that the process has been used in a managerialist manner 
to steer through a public sector reform schedule, which seeks tighter, more 
controlling management structures, and which risks undermining the core public 
service ethos. This suggests a version of ‘deliberative democracy’ that is largely 
instrumental; the use of partnership as a legitimisation tool (see Bacon and 
Samuel (2009: 245) for a similar discussion in the UK context).  
 
Ultimately, it was an issue relating to public sector reform that proved to be the 
final nail in the partnership coffin. In March 2009, the government broke off 
negotiations with the social partners on a new social pact and unilaterally 
introduced pay cuts for all public sector workers (on top of the levies introduced 
on public service pay in January 2009). Despite this action, the unions held off on 
taking collective action (apart from a one-day stoppage in November), re-entered 
talks with the Government and, seemingly, reached a deal in early December, 
which promised further extensive reforms of public sector work practices in return 
for no further pay reductions (O’ Kelly, 2010). At the core of the deal was a plan 
for 12 days’ unpaid leave for public sector workers. Although unpaid leave- 
essentially a form of work sharing- is a fairly standard approach to addressing 
commercial difficulties in the private sector, and despite the fact that many other 
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European countries have introduced similar measures in the face of the crisis 
(reductions in working time in Germany and the Netherlands, for example), the 
plan was denounced by many sections of the media as a ‘cave in’ to the public 
sector unions (Roche, 2010). Subsequently, the Taoiseach ‘found himself facing 
a revolt of ministers and backbench members of his parliamentary party’ who 
were unprepared to support the proposals (O’ Kelly, 2010: 427).  
 
The episode showed up, yet again, the fault lines that had long been appearing 
in the partnership process. The Government, once the political benefit of 
engaging the public sector unions in talks diminished, immediately and 
unilaterally walked away from the process. For the public sector unions, the 
reform process with which they engaged in recent years, and even the 
concession bargaining in which they engaged in 2008-09, was insufficient to 
keep the Government at the partnership table, when the latter was confronted by 
the perceived demands of electoral pragmatism.  
 
A particularly damaging legacy for the unions from the breakdown of partnership 
has been the emergence of a perceived ‘divide’ between workers in the private 
and public sector workforces, which has dominated recent public discourse in 
Ireland. Some commentators, pointing to the fact that the general public 
perception of unions is largely positive (see Geary, 2007), focused on the role of 
the media in this regard. As Roche puts it: 
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‘In the print media, in particular, editorial commentary seemed 
overwhelmingly hostile towards unions, their proposals for achieving cuts 
in the public service pay bill and social partnership. It seemed that “open 
season” had been declared on social partnership and that it had effectively 
become tainted through its association with the nexus of failed institutions 
of the Celtic Tiger era… This was a new phenomenon. In more that 25 
years observing and commenting on industrial relations in Ireland, I recall 
nothing to compare with the tenor of commentary in sections of the media 
on the slow death of social partnership and its associated discontents. 
Columnists, commentators, phone-in and chat-show hosts would of 
course claim that their output reflected public opinion. While opinion-poll 
data showed no clear trend towards growing public hostility towards 
unions, this no doubt was true in part. But it would be reasonable to 
suggest that media commentary also channelled and even seeded public 
disaffection with unions, public servants and social partnership’. 
 
The breakdown in trust between the public sector unions and the Government as 
a result of this affair and the significant media hostility generated towards unions 
and the partnership process in its final days (not forgetting the swift reaction by 
politicians to this) will make putting the pieces of partnership back together again 
unlikely in the short-medium term.  
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Conclusion 
This article has argued that, ultimately, the Irish case can be categorised as one 
of ‘pragmatic partnership’. The process emerged as a pragmatic response to 
crisis in the 1980s, and the respective parties’ commitment to social partnership 
was sustained for most of its lifetime by economic success and employment 
growth (Rittau and Dundon, 2010). Although sustained criticism of the process 
related to its lack of achievements in terms of economic and social equity (see 
Kirby, 2010), this did not fundamentally threaten the model as long as it was able 
to ‘enlarge the economic pie’ in a manner that provided the ‘overwhelming 
number of citizens with larger slices, notwithstanding that their overall share was 
more or less the same as before’ (Teague and Donaghey, 2009: 73).  
 
However, the positions of the parties had altered when crisis struck again. The 
State, while finding the process invaluable for legitimising cutbacks in social 
services and pay restraint in the 1980s, in the preparation for EMU and, later, in 
garnering union support for its public sector reform agenda quickly reneged on 
agreements, ignored the social partners and withdrew support upon unilaterally 
deciding that the banking and fiscal crisis post-2007 demanded a strategy of 
swingeing cuts. Employer representative groups by this time were less able (or 
willing) to hold their constituency together in the face of challenges from 
increasingly vocal employers critical of partnership. Private sector employers 
have seemingly been emboldened by union weakness, following the failure of 
unions to strengthen their representation rights under social partnership. In the 
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public sector, employers may also have been emboldened by recent events: the 
acquiescence to the new public management reform agenda by unions and staff, 
copper-fastened by partnership agreements since the late 1990s; the recent 
concessions granted by public service unions under the Croke Park Agreement, 
which emerged following the collapse of the process; and ongoing media-and 
public?-hostility towards public sector unions and staff. It may be possible that a 
less supportive State approach to public sector unionisation than has historically 
been the case emerges as a by-product of the collapse of partnership.  
 
For the unions, the collapse of the process means the end of the principal 
strategy with which they have engaged over 20 years. The crucial failure under 
social partnership, to link their institutional role at national level with a 
strengthening of autonomous trade union and worker representative structures at 
workplace level (cf, Baccaro, 2002 on the Italian case), has ultimately made them 
less ‘useful’ as a social partner. Arguably, the end of partnership has been 
strategically disorienting above all for the unions; it is not clear exactly where 
they will go from here.  
 
The pragmatism of the actors involved might have resulted in the process coming 
to life in 1987 and being sustained at various junctures over its 20-year lifetime, 
and we have seen that personal relations amongst various partnership 
champions were also key, but it is true to say that a partly self-sustaining 
partnership ‘industry’ (of working groups, review groups, strategy groups and 
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networks) also emerged, the achievements of which remain debatable. To some 
extent the process generated its own momentum; as long as the tune of 
economic growth and employment creation was playing, the participants 
(whether music-lovers or not!) seemed unwilling to get off the dance-floor for fear 
of being left, lonely, at the margins. However, when the band stopped playing, 
the weakness of the ‘deliberative governance’ aspect of partnership was 
demonstrated. While deliberation and problem-solving became ingrained in the 
partnership process, ‘hard’ decision-making and policy implementation remained 
centralised and, ultimately, subject to Governmental whim.  
 
As Teague and Donaghy (2009) argue, the Irish model, to an appreciable extent, 
emerged by serendipity rather than clever policy design. However, they argue 
that the longevity of the system was due to its becoming an integral part of a 
system of institutional complementarities that propelled economic growth and 
prosperity. Unfortunately, when the ‘perfect storm’ of a global economic crisis, a 
slump in economic growth and a rapid decline in prosperity hit in 2007, the 
partnership model, given its weak ideological foundations, proved unable to 
adapt and renew itself. The partners quickly (and brutally) brought an end to the 
affair.   
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i
 Available at http://www.onegov.ie/eng/Publications/Public_Service_Agreement_2010_-
_20141.pdf 
ii
  The employers’ groups party to T2016, in addition to IBEC, were the Construction Industry 
Federation (CIF), Small Firms’ Association (SFA), Irish Exporters’ Association (IEA), Irish Tourist 
Industry Confederation (ITIC) and Chambers Ireland. 
iii
 All of these are purely domestic legislative initiatives, as opposed to being mandated by EU law. 
iv
 Including, inter alia, opportunities for employees to contribute to meeting the challenge of global 
competition, co-operation with change, including new forms of work organisation, and financial 
involvement; see paragraph 9.15 of Partnership 2000. 
v
 [2007] IESC 6.  
vi
 This interpretation would seem to suggest that a legislative right to trade union recognition, such 
as exists, for example, in the UK, would be constitutionally prohibited. It should be noted that the 
Supreme Court decision would appear to be somewhat at variance with the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Demir and Baykara v Turkey (Application No 34503/97, 12 
November 2008). There, the Court ruled that the right to collectively bargain with an employer in 
principle had become one of the ‘essential elements’ of the right to form and join trade unions, 
guaranteed under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. 
vii
 As Hardiman (2007: 7) notes ‘despite the 139 pages of dense text in Towards 2016, the bottom 
line for unions and employers alike is nominal pay’. 
viii
 See, for example, paragraph 27.18 of Towards 2016. 
